AC Milan 2026 Financial Statements: €133 Million in Player Sales and a €24 Million Loss

On June 30, 2026, when AC Milan's finance department closed the books on fiscal year 2026-26, a paradox appeared on the balance sheet. The club brought in at least €133.3 million from player sales, yet simultaneously recorded a net loss of around €24 million. After three consecutive profitable years from 2026 to 2026, Milan returned to a loss-making state.

I have spent most of my career reading reports like this. From nights cross-checking contract figures in Shanghai to cross-time-zone calls with agents in Europe, I learned one thing: a balance sheet does not lie, but it does not voluntarily tell the whole story either. It only opens up when the reader knows how to ask the right question. Here, the central question is clear: if Milan sold over €133 million worth of players, why did they still lose €24 million?

To answer that, the club's finances must be placed in the correct time frame. Three years earlier, from 2026 to 2026, this club was a model of financial governance in Serie A. They were profitable, they controlled their wage bill, and they built a business model on two pillars: commercial and broadcast revenue, and profit from player trading.

Fiscal year 2026 was notably embellished by one major deal: Tijjani Reijnders to Manchester City. That money was booked in 2026, helping that year turn a profit. By 2026, Milan had no comparable inflow, and the picture changed colour. This is the base effect that financial analysts talk about: a year inflated by one-off revenue makes the following year look worse than it really is.

Milan's revenue in fiscal year 2026 reached around €464 million, down about 6% year on year. The cause was stated directly: the club did not take part in European cups and domestic cup competitions at the decisive stage. Absence from cup competitions not only removes matchday and broadcast income, it shortens the fixture calendar, reduces commercial opportunity, and thins cash flow.

This is the crucial point many readers miss. The revenue of a European football club is tightly bound to its results. When a team drops out of cup rounds, revenue drops with it. A financial balance sheet is therefore often a sporting story wearing accounting clothes. A team eliminated early in Europe will see the consequences appear in the revenue line months later, not immediately in the league table.

Now let us break down the €133.3 million figure. This is the total of proceeds disclosed in fiscal year 2026, excluding potential bonuses. The specific list: Malick Thiaw to Newcastle for €34.1 million. Theo Hernandez to Al-Hilal for €25 million. Alex Jimenez for €18.5 million. Noah Okafor to Leeds for €18 million. Alvaro Morata for €11 million. Emerson Royal for €9 million. Lorenzo Colombo to Genoa for €7.6 million, with the buy option exercised. Yacine Adli to Al Shabab for €5.2 million. Tommaso Pobega to Bologna for €4.9 million, also under a buy-option mechanism.

Added together, the figure is approximately €133.3 million, before bonuses. What stands out is not the total, but the structure of the sales portfolio. Milan sold three different types of assets, and each carries its own financial meaning.

The first type is peak developed assets. Malick Thiaw, a centre-back, went to Newcastle for €34.1 million. This is the largest proceeds item on the list and almost certainly carries substantial book profit, since Milan bought him for far less. Theo Hernandez, a left-back, went to Al-Hilal for €25 million. In numerical terms, this is the most controversial deal, and I will return to it later.

The second type is buy-then-flip contracts. Alvaro Morata left for €11 million, just one year after arriving. Emerson Royal left for €9 million, also just one year after arriving. This is not a market accident, but a recruitment failure - a direct mark against the sporting department's scorecard. When you buy a player at a high price and sell him a year later at a significantly lower price, that loss is recorded clearly in the books, and it reflects an error in assessing the player's ability or in the contract structure.

The third type is academy products. Lorenzo Colombo to Genoa for €7.6 million. Tommaso Pobega to Bologna for €4.9 million. Both under exercised buy options. These are the deals that deliver near-full profit, because a player developed in the academy carries a book value of almost zero. The entire transfer fee is booked as gain. In the language of financial fair play, these are the cleanest and most effective weapons.

A contract never dies in the signing room; it dies in the clause we underestimate. Looking at Colombo and Pobega, it is clear Milan embedded buy-option mechanisms into their loan deals. This mechanism shifts proceeds into a later fiscal year, creating timing volatility in the accounts. That is why the €133.3 million figure must be read alongside dates, not as a simple total.

And here is the core paradox. Milan brought in at least €133.3 million from player sales, yet still lost €24 million. In the accounting of Italian clubs, revenue is usually measured by the concept of fatturato, which by convention excludes player-trading profit, booked separately. That means operating performance before player trading was materially worse than the €24 million headline loss suggests.

In other words, the player sales are what keep the loss at €24 million, not what creates it. Without €133 million in player sales, Milan's loss would be far larger. This is a transfer-dependent financial model, and it is fragile against any market fluctuation.

Money can move a player, but timing is what makes him leave his seat. Look at the Theo Hernandez case. He left for €25 million, a low price for a left-back once regarded as top-tier at his peak. That figure is equal to or below the price of a centre-back like Thiaw, and well below his previous market peak.

There is a more plausible explanation than blaming the market. When a player approaches contract expiry, the club's bargaining power falls sharply. If Theo Hernandez had only one year left on his deal, Milan was forced to accept a price below true value, because the alternative was losing him for free. This is the kind of deal I call a contract-loss cut, not a value-maximising sale.

This fits a familiar pattern. Big Serie A clubs routinely find themselves selling peak assets to the Premier League or to Gulf clubs, and they sell from a position of weakness. Newcastle, Al-Hilal, Manchester City - these buyers sit at a higher financial tier. Milan sits as a club that sells to reinvest.

A player's true value is not in the number, but in the price a club is willing to fail for him. With Theo Hernandez, Milan decided they were not willing to accept the risk of keeping him to contract expiry. They sold, accepted a low price, to secure cash flow. With Thiaw, they sold at peak value because he had a long contract and a buyer willing to pay high. Placed side by side, these two deals show the difference between selling proactively and selling reactively.

As for bonuses, the report states clearly that the figures exclude potential bonuses that may arise after June 30 and do not affect last season's accounts. This is normal accounting practice, but it carries two meanings. On one hand, it understates the true eventual proceeds. On the other, it de-risks the 2026 figures, because uncertain bonuses are not recognised early. This is a prudent, standards-consistent choice that reduces rather than increases compliance risk.

There is another fact that needs proper placement. The Tijjani Reijnders sale to Manchester City was booked in fiscal year 2026, not 2026. This means the 2026 accounts were flattered by that deal, while the 2026 accounts do not benefit from it. The two years are not directly comparable, and the 2026 loss is partly a base-effect artefact, not necessarily a collapse of the core operating business.

However, there is one reality that cannot be excused by base effect. That is the Morata and Emerson Royal deals. Buying a player and selling him a year later at a far lower price is a clearly recorded loss. This is the kind of mistake a sporting director must answer for. The report references Igli Tare's tenure, which shows these deals were executed under a specific sporting-department mandate.

The data turning point here is clear: the same department, in the same tenure, produced both successful peak-value sales and failed buy-and-flip losses. Thiaw, Theo Hernandez and Jimenez are good sales. Morata and Emerson Royal are poor purchases. Both sides of the coin sit on the same scorecard.

One detail about Alex Jimenez deserves mention. The €18.5 million proceeds for this young player, with the buyer ambiguously recorded between Fiorentina and Bournemouth. When the buying party's identity is unclear in a financial report, that is a signal requiring further verification. In my experience, figures with an unclear buyer source are usually where questions should be placed, even if the proceeds themselves may be entirely legitimate.

A financial crisis does not kill the transfer market; it only digs graves for the naive who cling to old prices. Milan is operating a model many big clubs do not want to admit: selling peak assets to balance the books. This is the strategy of a smaller club being run by a big one.

Look at the broader picture. Milan sold to Newcastle, Al-Hilal, Manchester City, Leeds, Al Shabab. This is the financial power map of European football today. The Premier League and the Gulf leagues are the buyers at the top tier. Serie A, despite its history and brand, sits as the seller. Milan is not alone in this position, but they are the clearest example of how a giant must bend to the financial current.

One important thing the report does not disclose is spending on incoming players, and wage-bill data. Without these two pieces, the net transfer balance and the wage-to-revenue ratio cannot be assessed. This is a significant blind spot. Without wage data, amortisation data, or net-debt data, any full break-even projection under financial fair play rules is impossible from this source alone.

On financial fair play compliance, the €24 million loss after three profitable years is the most important datapoint. Whether it breaches the threshold depends on multi-year aggregation and the treatment of player-trading profit, neither of which is fully disclosed. The central case is that the one-off loss is offset by the large 2026 transfer-profit pool and academy gains, keeping the club within compliance bands without sanction.

It is worth noting that relying on player-trading profit to offset operating losses is a familiar pattern for evading financial fair play pressure. If future transfer windows produce fewer or cheaper deals, the compliance cushion thins quickly. Academy products like Colombo and Pobega are the most compliance-efficient tools, because nearly the entire fee can be booked as gain. This is a deliberate strategy that understands the rules of the game.

From a sporting angle, selling both starting full-backs Theo Hernandez and Emerson Royal, plus a starting centre-back in Thiaw, points to a comprehensive rebuild of the defensive line. This is an on-pitch integration risk the balance sheet cannot capture. When you overhaul an entire defence in one season, you need time for the new pieces to gel, and during that window, on-pitch results can worsen, dragging future revenue with them.

An agent can hold every phone number; a true dealer knows exactly when to hang up. Milan in fiscal year 2026 chose to hang up at exactly the right moments. They sold Thiaw when the price peaked. They sold Theo Hernandez when his contract was running out. They exercised the buy options on Colombo and Pobega to draw cash from the academy. Each decision had its own timing logic.

But there is a flip side. When a club continuously sells peak assets, it creates a sell-to-reinvest cycle. That cycle only works if the buying side is efficient. And this is precisely the weakness exposed by this very report. Morata and Emerson Royal show that Milan's buying side failed to create value, and that failure erodes the entire model.

If Milan sells well but buys poorly, each transfer cycle erodes another piece of the club's assets. This is the spiral many clubs have fallen into, and it is not easy to escape without improving recruitment quality.

I have watched many clubs go through this phase. Since the Oscar case in 2026, when I uncovered the €40 million discrepancy between the release clause and the published figure, I understood that transparency in football always has limits. Financial reports give us part of the truth; the rest lies in add-on clauses, in contract structures, and in decisions that are never recorded.

At Milan in 2026, the recorded part of the truth shows a club balancing on a fragile wire. They have an academy machine capable of generating clean profit. They can sell peak assets at good prices when timing is favourable. But they also have a recruitment side that is causing losses, and a revenue model overly dependent on sporting results.

It is worth noting that the original report from Goal.com, citing Radio Rossonera, actively adopted editorial language, calling the Morata and Emerson Royal deals cut-price sales. This is a signal of media pressure forming around the recruitment department. In Italian football, this kind of pressure tends to escalate if the replacement signings underperform.

One sporting reality must be placed on the table. Absence from cup competitions in the relevant season was a direct cause of the revenue decline. That means the sporting priority for the coming season can be nothing other than reclaiming a European qualification spot. This is not just a table target, but a survival condition for the financial model.

If Milan returns to European competition, revenue recovers, pressure on the books eases, and the recruitment side gains room to correct mistakes. If they continue to be absent, the loss will repeat, and peak-asset sales will become mandatory rather than a strategic choice. The difference between proactive and reactive selling lies precisely here: when you sell because you want to, you hold bargaining power; when you sell because you must, you lose it.

Oscar taught me a lesson: do not ask a player why he left, ask the club why it let him go. With Milan, the answer lies in the 6% revenue decline, in the €24 million loss, and in a fixture calendar missing cup matches. The club let Theo Hernandez go because it needed cash flow, let Thiaw go because the price peaked, and let Colombo and Pobega go because they were the cleanest profit source. Each decision is reasonable in isolation, but placed together, they paint the portrait of a club living off player sales.

What will shape the coming season is not how much Milan sells, but who they buy. The €133.3 million in proceeds is a fact of the past. It only matters if reinvested effectively into a squad capable of reclaiming a European spot. Otherwise, the spiral continues, and the 2027 balance sheet will tell the same story with different names.

The transfer market does not reward selling well. It rewards buying right. And that is the test Milan has yet to pass.